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Preliminary Injunction: What’s Your Function?
The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Defense Council and the effect on
this Extraordinary Remedy.
Amanda Laird
I. INTRODUCTION
“There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
caution, deliberation and sound discretion, and which is more dangerous in a doubtful
case, than the issuing of an injunction.”1 A preliminary injunction is often described as
an extraordinary and potent remedy. 2 This remedy, however, is a common tool in federal
litigation practice and regularly used in a variety of civil actions.3

Despite its

extraordinary status and common presence in America’s judicial system, there is much
disarray surrounding this procedural tool.
The federal circuit courts are in disharmony on the substantive principles
pertaining to a preliminary injunction.4 “There are variations among the various circuit
courts of appeals as to the standard to be applied, how the elements of the standard are
considered, the relative weight to be assigned to each element, and the inclination to grant
relief beyond the maintenance of status quo.”5

While each circuit agrees that the

preliminary injunction test rests on four factors, courts apply these four factors in various
different ways.

The Supreme Court has yet to expressly resolve the variation of

standards among the circuit courts.

1

Citizens’ Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R.R. Co., 29 N.J. Eq. 299, 303 (1878).
Andrew Muscato, The Preliminary Injunction in Business Litigation, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 649 (2007).
3
Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV.
LITIG. 495, 496.
4
Muscato, supra note 2 at 650 (“Somewhat surprisingly, the substantive and procedural principles
pertaining to a preliminary injunction in federal court are not as clear or settled as commonly thought.”).
5
Id. at 650.
2

Proponents of a uniform standard argue that different standards and different
required levels of burdens serve an injustice to parties seeking preliminary injunctive
relief.6 This injustice includes inequitable decisions and inconsistent applications of the
standards. Some proponents argue that the Supreme Court should articulate one standard
which would enable seeking a preliminary injunction more efficient for both movants and
the courts.7 The Supreme Court has yet to enforce one standard; however, the Court
recently, in Winter v. Natural Defense Council, criticized the standard used by the Ninth
Circuit.
The Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision to grant a preliminary
injunction restraining the United States Navy’s usage of MFA sonar during antisubmarine warfare training.8 The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
stated that the Ninth Circuit’s standard for irreparable harm was too lenient.9 The Ninth
Circuit required that the movant only show that irreparable harm was a possibility.10 The
Court ultimately held the preliminary injunction had to be denied because irreparable
harm should be likely and the movant did not satisfy this heightened burden.11
The Supreme Court raised the threshold level a movant must meet in satisfying
the burden of showing irreparable harm beyond that required by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. The opinion also discusses applying all four factors equally; however,
it does not expressly reject the sliding scale method of granting injunctive relief. 12 This

6

Denlow, supra note 3; see also Muscato, supra note 2.
Denlow, supra note 3.
8
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S.Ct. 365 (2008).
9
Id at 375.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7

2

decision may have far reaching effects on lower federal courts’ standards for injunctive
relief.
This comment discusses the effect of the Winter decision on the preliminary
injunction standard in the lower courts and how this decision may be one step closer to a
uniform standard. The Winter decision emphasizes the importance of injunctive relief by
tightening the standard and increasing the burden on the movant to show that preliminary
injunctive relief is a necessary remedy. Recently, several lower courts, which had used
different formulations of the test, have interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision as
prescribing one standard. The courts of appeals are bound by the decisions of the
Supreme Court; the emergence of one standard for granting or denying a preliminary
injunction is possible and the circuit courts will finally be in harmony over this
extraordinary remedy.

II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
The preliminary injunction is “an equitable remedy derived from the principles of
judicial remedies devised and administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time
the United States divorced itself from England.”13 The main distinction between law and
equity is the remedy each offers. In courts of law, the most common remedy is monetary
damages. Courts of equity, however, enter injunctions which either prevent someone
from acting or require someone to act.
Equity developed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in England into the
“extraordinary justice administered by the King’s Chancellor to enlarge, supplant or

13

Denlow, supra note 3 at 500 (quoting Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999)).

3

override the common law system where that system had become too narrow and rigid in
its scope.”14 Equity was to remain flexible and different from the common law system.
However, the principles governing injunctions today developed primarily in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to forbid parties from doing some threatened act that
would work irreparable harm to another party.15
Equity’s primary focus was to provide relief where the result at law would be
unjust and where the public interest would be benefited by either the enforcement or
prevention of contracts.16 To prevent unjust results, “equity, fundamentally, [was and] is
based upon the power of the court to do what ‘reason and conscience’ require in the
particular case.”17 Every case that fell into the hands of the Chancery court was to be
determined according to the discretion of the court. There were no set ground rules for
courts to follow and courts made decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Once English equity practice arrived in the American Colonies, the American
courts of equity commonly used the injunction as a preventative and protective tool,
rather than a restorative tool in which to make a party whole again. 18 Prior to the merger
of law and equity, equity was viewed as a supplemental system of jurisprudence. 19 When

14

Muscato, supra note 2 at 653( quoting Goldwin Smith, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 209 (1955)); see also Bradford E. Dempsey, Nancy L. Dempsey & Kirstin L. Stoll-DeBell,
USING PRESUMPTIONS TO TIP THE BALANCE FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, 33 LIT. 15 (Fall, 2006) (“The
chancellor, a high minister appointed by the king, exercised the king’s arbitrary power to ‘do justice’ in
certain cases, including the power to grant injunctive relief. Vested with these equitable powers, the
chancellor was a powerful figure who possessed vast discretion in applying equitable remedies. Often a
bishop of the church, the chancellor frequently relied on appeals to conscience in determining whether to
grant injunctive relief.”).
15
Id. at 654.
16
Walsh, supra note 15 at 42.
17
Id. at 43.
18
William F. Walsh, A TREATISE ON EQUITY, § 9 at 155 (1930).
19
11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2942 (2d ed. 1995).
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a legal remedy was inadequate, an equitable remedy was available.20 Thus, equity and
law were distinct. However, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
law and equity merged.21
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the focus of the preliminary injunction
standard was to maintain the status quo of the matter in dispute, pending a trial on the
merits.22 The Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., held
that the scope of federal equity jurisdiction should be “in accordance with such rules and
principles as governed by the action of the Court of Chancery in England which
administered equity at the time of the emigration of our ancestors and down to the
Constitution.”23 Equity cases were governed by the rules of Equity promulgated by the
Supreme Court in 1912.24 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in
1938, thus creating a union between law and equity.25
Although merged, law and equity differ on many different aspects.

Equity

prevents someone from acting, while law remedies an injured party through damages.
Equity was derived from the Maxims of Equity and developed with no fixed rules of its
own.26 The Lord Chancellor made decisions based according to his own conscience.27

20

Denlow, supra note 3 at 501.
Dempsey, supra note 14.
22
Id.
23
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 460, 462 (1855).
24
Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV 173, 177
(1984).
25
Id.
26
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2942 (The maxims of equity are the traditional principles applied by the
courts of equity. Some include: “equity regards as done that which ought to be done,” “equity will not
suffer a wrong to be without a remedy,” and “equity delights in equality.”).
27
Id.
21
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However, equity began to lose a bit of its flexibility as the system became a law of
precedent.28
After 1938, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governed injunctive relief. 29 This
rule set forth certain procedural requirements to prevent abuse of the rule. When Rule 65
was formulated, it depended on traditional principles of equity and did not alter
substantive prerequisites.30

Rule 65 did “not set out a comprehensive or detailed

procedural framework for seeking injunctive relief.”31 Since the rule does not set forth a
detailed procedural framework, the court is left to the principles of equity when granting
or denying injunctive relief.

III. THE ROLE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN TODAY’S FEDERAL COURTS
Today, courts frequently issue preliminary injunctions to protect the plaintiff from
irreparable injuries and to ensure that courts may provide meaningful relief after a trial on
the merits.32 Plaintiffs do not always seek monetary damages as relief. A preliminary
injunction is a remedy that temporarily restrains activity until there has been a trial on the
merits.33 A plaintiff may request a preliminary injunction to “guard against a change in
conditions” which may prevent the granting of proper relief.34 This guard functions as a
way to preserve “the status quo,” as well as require someone to act through affirmative

28

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
30
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2941.
31
Muscato, supra note 2 at 657.
32
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2947.
33
Id.
34
U.S. v. Adler’s Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1939).
29
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preliminary injunctions, and “is to be issued only upon showing that there would
otherwise be danger of irreparable injury.”35
Rule 65 governs every injunction and restraining order, including preliminary
injunctions.36

However, the final decision whether to grant or deny a preliminary

injunction rests in the discretion of the court. While each court retains discretion, most
courts discuss or examine some or all of the four most important factors in deciding
whether to grant or deny an injunction:
a. the movant’s likelihood of success;
b. the likelihood that movant will suffer irreparable injury if the request for preliminary
injunction is denied;
c. the balance of hardships between the parties coupled against hardship faced by nonparties; and
d. the effect of grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief on public policy.37
The courts of appeals employ different formulations of these four factors when
determining whether to grant or deny injunctions. 38
A movant’s likelihood of success, focuses on the probability that the movant will
ultimately succeed on the merits.39 “If the trial court determines the movant is not likely
to ultimately succeed on the merits, preliminary injunctive relief generally will be

35

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
37
13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(1)(a) (3d. ed. 1999).
38
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2947 (“The circumstances in which a preliminary injunction may be
granted are not prescribed by the Federal Rules. As a result, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction
remains a matter for the trial court’s discretion, which is exercised in conformity with historical federal
practice.”).
39
13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(2) (3d. ed. 1999)
36
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denied.”40 There are several variations of this test, ranging from a “reasonable certainty”
that the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on the merits to a “strong likelihood.”41
Courts generally consider the irreparable injury to be the most important
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.42 Irreparable harm is harm for
which a court could not compensate a “movant should the movant prevail in the final
decree.”43

In the past, courts balanced this factor with the movant’s likelihood of

success, and the level of harm needed by the movant varied. Some circuits held that a
movant had to show a “possibility “ of harm, while others required that irreparable harm
be “likely” if the injunction were not granted.44
Courts also balance the hardship to the parties when considering whether to deny
or grant a preliminary injunction.45 Courts will compare the severity of the impact on
both the plaintiff and the defendant in determining whether to grant the injunction.46
Courts determine hardship by considering “if the hardship experienced by the movant, if
the injunction were denied, would outweigh the hardship experienced by the non-movant,
if the injunction were granted.”47 Courts will likely deny a request for a preliminary
injunction if the non-movant may experience hardship if the injunction were granted that
outweighs the hardship of the movant, if the injunction were denied.48 Thus, courts
balance the effects of injunctions on both movants and non-movants and will grant

40

Id.
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2948.3.
42
Id. at § 2948.1.
43
13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(1)(a) (3d. ed. 1999).
44
See Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375.
45
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2948.2.
46
Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. Interdigital Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 1994).
47
13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(1)(e) (3d. ed. 1999).
48
13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(1)(e) (3d. ed. 1999).
41
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preliminary injunctions in favor of movants only if the denial of the injunction would
cause the movant to experience greater irreparable harm.
Lastly, courts discuss the effect of injunctive relief on public policy when
rendering a decision.49 Courts often emphasize whether the public interest is furthered or
if it is injured by the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction.50 “In exercising their
sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”51 In Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
courts’ decisions to grant a preliminary injunction stating that the lower courts
“significantly understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the
Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises, and the injunction’s consequent
adverse impact on the public interest in national defense.”52 Thus, the consideration of
public interest is pertinent in considering whether to grant or deny injunctive relief.53

IV. DIFFERING STANDARDS AMONG FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS
Each court of appeals employs the four general factors when determining whether
to grant or deny a preliminary injunction; however, each court varies in its articulation of
these factors. The circuit courts fall into distinct groups based on the standard each
employs for determining whether to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief. The
majority of the circuits (the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh,
49

Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 376.
See Wright, supra note 21 at § 2948.4.
51
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 376-77 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)).
52
Id. at 377.
53
Amoco Production Co v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); see also 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22(1)(e) (3d. ed. 1999) (“. . . the public interest may be a predominant
factor, even in the preliminary injunction determination in an action between private parties, if the matter is
found to have a substantial impact on the public interest.”).
50
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D.C. and Federal courts) utilize some variation of the traditional four-part test when
considering preliminary injunctions.54 The Second and the Ninth Circuits employ a twopart test that focuses on balancing factors that courts find most important; this two part
test combines the four factors and does not weigh each one separately as seen in the
traditional four part test.55 The Seventh Circuit “uses a sliding-scale method in which a
five-part test is implemented.”56
A. Traditional Four Part Test
The traditional four-part test generally requires a movant to satisfy certain criteria
before a court will grant an injunction. The required criteria are: “(1) that plaintiff will
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury outweighs
any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3) that plaintiff
has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest will not
be adversely affected by the granting of the injunction.”57 Although a majority of the
courts of appeals uses the traditional four-part test, virtually all of these courts employ
varying forms of the test.58
Some courts, such as those in the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of
Columbia and Federal, require strict adherence to the traditional four part test.59 These

54

Denlow, supra note 3 at 515.
Id.
56
Id.; see also Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Sitting as a
court of equity, the court then weighs all these factors employing a sliding-scale approach.”).
57
Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Women’s Community Health
Ctr., Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D.Me. 1979); see also Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 303
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
58
Muscato, supra note 2 at 665.
59
Denlow, supra note 3 at 515-16; see also 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
65.22(5)(m) (3d. ed. 1999) (“In the Federal Circuit, procedural matters and substantive matters over which
the court does not have exclusive jurisdiction are reviewed under the law of the circuit in which the district
court is located . . . because of the unique nature of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, two different
standards may be applied in cases involving general federal jurisdiction as well as issues subject to the
court’s exclusive jurisdiction.”).
55
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courts weigh the four factors separately and require a strong showing for each factor.
The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits require district courts to apply their four-part test
because “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy [which] should only be
granted if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four factors.”60
The circuit courts consider all four factors and no factor alone “will tip the balance.”61
The Tenth Circuit and the DC Circuit, however, merely require the presence of all four
factors and do not require that each factor meet a threshold level.62 For example, the
court in Koerpel v. Heckler stated that in situations where the plaintiff satisfied just three
of the preliminary injunction requirements, it would apply a “modified version of the
fourth requirement, the ‘substantial success on the merits’ test:”
Where the movant prevails on the other factors this court has adopted the
Second Circuit’s liberal definition of the ‘probability of success’
requirement: ‘To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the
plaintiff’s right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain,
wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i.e., the balance of
hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that
the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial,
difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus
for more deliberate investigation.63
Five of the courts of appeals emphasize specific factors. The First Circuit’s
preliminary injunction test required that the plaintiff meet four criteria: “(1) that plaintiff
will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) that such injury
60

Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985).
Denlow, supra note 3 at 518.
62
See Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s East, Inc. 362 F.3d 639, 652-653 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Lundgrin v.
Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980) (These circuits do not require a conclusive showing of each
factor, "[t]o justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plaintiff's right to a final decision,
after a trial, be absolutely certain, wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i.e., the balance
of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised
questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them a fair ground
for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.”)); see also Federal Lands Legal Consortium v.
US, 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Cityfed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d
738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .
63
Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 866 (10th Cir. 1986).
61
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outweighs any harm which granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendant; (3)
that plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public
interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of the injunction.” 64 Further, the
First Circuit has held that “the heart of this test is the second and third steps, which
present the question whether the harm caused plaintiff without the injunction, in light of
the plaintiff’s likelihood of eventual success on the merits, outweighs the harm the
injunction will cause defendant.”65 Here the First Circuit considered all factors but
focused on the movant’s likelihood of success and the likelihood the movant will suffer
irreparable injury if the request for preliminary injunction is denied in rendering its
decision.
Similarly in Latin American Music Company, Inc. v. Cardena Fernandez &
Assoc., Inc., the First Circuit reiterated its tendency to focus on the plaintiff’s likelihood
of success on the merits.66

The court vacated the lower court’s decision to deny

injunctive relief based on the plaintiff’s failure to meet irreparable harm and remanded
for further proceedings.67 The court stated that likelihood of success is “likely to be the
key issue as to injunctive relief” and wanted the lower court to make an appropriate
finding of all factors under FRCP 65.68
The Third Circuit also considers and weighs the four factors utilized in the
traditional four factor test, but emphasizes two factors: (1) the likelihood of success on

64

Vargas-Figueroa v. Saldana, 826 F.2d 160, 162 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544
F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976)).
66
Latin American Music Company, Inc. v. Cardenas Fernandez & Assoc., Inc., 2 Fed. Appx. 40 (1st Cir.
2001).
67
Id. at 42.
68
Id.
65
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the merits and (2) the probability of immediate and irreparable harm.69 The Third Circuit
overturned a preliminary injunction in Campbell Soup Company v. Conagra Inc. because
the movant was unable to show immediate and irreparable harm. 70

The movant,

Campbell Soup Company, requested a preliminary injunction to prevent its competitor,
Conagra, Inc. from creating a non-fried frozen chicken product similar to one in
production at Campbell Soup Company.71 The court when weighing all four factors
places a special emphasis on irreparable harm by stating that a movant must “demonstrate
potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following a
trial.”72 The court held the movant did not satisfy this burden because there was no
evidence that immediate irreparable harm would occur without the injunction because
Conagra was not close to marketing a non-fried frozen chicken product.73 The court
overturned the preliminary injunction primarily because the movant did not satisfy its
burden just on a showing of irreparable harm.
Similarly the Fourth Circuit requires the movant to demonstrate the four
traditional factors; equal weight is not placed on each factor.74 The Fourth Circuit stated
in Hughes Network Sys. v. Interdigital Corp., that all four factors are considered;
however, not all weighed equally.75 The court stated that “the ‘balance of hardships’
reached by comparing relevant harms to the plaintiff and defendant is the most important

69

E.g., Campbell Soup v. Conagra, 977 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1992).
Campbell Soup, 977 F.2d 86.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 91-92 (“Establishing a risk of irreparable harm is not enough. A plaintiff has the burden of proving
a ‘clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.’ The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be
irreparable—not merely serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in
money cannot atone for it.’”).
73
Id. at 92.
74
E.g., Hughes Network Sys., 17 F.3d 691.
75
Id. at 693.
70
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determination . . . .”76 The court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings
because the district court did not take a close enough look at the magnitude of harm to
each party.77
While the Sixth Circuit primarily has followed the traditional four part test, some
of the court’s past decisions indicate a different approach, such as in Roth v. Bank of the
Commonwealth.78 The court in Roth held that an appraisal of the traditional factors is
necessary, but that a mechanical application of each standard is not an adequate test.79
After this decision, the Sixth Circuit placed an emphasis on certain factors and employs a
similar test as the First, Third and Fourth Circuits.
B. Separate Two-Prong Tests
The Second and Ninth Circuits utilize different variations of the standard for
preliminary injunctions. The Second Circuit implements a two-part alternative test.80
This two part test requires that “[a] party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
(1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) a
sufficiently serious question going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly in the moving party's favor.”81
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, before being reversed by the Supreme Court,
required that a movant demonstrate either: “(1) a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and
76

Id.
Id. at 695.
78
E.g., Mason County Med. Ass’n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977); See Roth v. Bank of the
Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1978) (Plaintiffs requested an injunction to restrain the
defendant bank from enforcing notes pledged by defendants as collateral for loans that were fraudulently
obtained through an illicit financing scheme.).
79
Roth, 583 F.2d at 537.
80
Denlow, supra note 3 at 527.
81
Brennan’s Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurant, L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson
Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)).
77
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the balance of hardships tips in [the movant’s] favor.”82 This test appears similar to that
of the Second Circuit; however, a movant in the Ninth Circuit could prevail by
“demonstrating success on two alternative balancing tests, one involving probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm and the other involving a
weighing of serious questions raised on the merits and the balance of hardships.”83
C. The Sliding Scale Method
The Seventh Circuit uses a “sliding scale method” when determining whether to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction. Under the sliding scale approach, the more likely
the movant will succeed on the merits, the less the court requires the balance of harms to
tip in the movant’s favor.84 However, if the plaintiff is less likely to win on the merits,
the balance of harms must weigh more heavily in the plaintiff’s favor. While the Seventh
Circuit does consider the four factors,85 the court generally relies on the sliding scale
method.

V. PROPONENTS OF A UNIFORM STANDARD
As of yet, the Supreme Court has not expressly articulated one standard to be
utilized by all the lower federal courts. However, many proponents of a uniform standard
urge the Supreme Court to articulate one standard for various different reasons.
82

Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, et. al. 303 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (The Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision to deny a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs demonstrated
both probable success on the merits and irreparable harm. The Plaintiffs were denied access to the Carson
City, Nevada government building because they were wearing clothing bearing symbols of different
motorcycle organizations. The court stated that the plaintiffs were able to show a high probability of
success on the merits that the rule by the Nevada government was discriminatory and that irreparable injury
would occur because of their loss of First Amendment freedoms. Due to the showing of both success on
the merits and irreparable injury, the court did not have to address the balancing of hardships.).
83
Denlow, supra note 3 at 528.
84
Roland Mach Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group,
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2001).
85
Libertarian Party v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Proponents argue that having different standards and levels of burdens on movants in
separate circuits does not serve justice.86 Discussion among proponents of a uniform
standard have brought to life that “apart from a lack of uniformity the standards
articulated are not precise rules and they are subject to case-by-case decision making – ‘a
procedure that emphasizes the salience of particulars and hampers judges in discerning
the systemic effects of the interpretive approaches they adopt.’”87
Proponents also argue that these varying standards lead to inequitable decisions
and cause the preliminary injunction tool to be commonly misunderstood.88 Scholars
have argued that a more uniform standard should replace the current standard for
considering preliminary injunctions or courts should simplify their standards. Also,
proponents of a more uniform standard argue that district courts apply the current
standard inconsistently.89
One proponent of a uniform standard is U.S. Magistrate Judge Martin Denlow. In
his article, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal
Standard, Denlow argues that courts should develop a uniform standard and suggested
this standard focus on efficiency.90 He also proposes a stricter standard for granting
preliminary injunctions.91

86

Muscato, supra note 2 at 667.
Id.
88
Denlow, supra note 3 at 531.
89
John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 566 (1978) (“A more
serious defect is the lack of an articulated rational. As a result, the relationship between the elements of the
standard remains obscure and the standard is subject to thoughtless and inconsistent application.”).
90
Denlow, supra note 3; see also Morton Denlow, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS: LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP,
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Denlow’s standard sets forth three factors. Denlow’s first factor requires that the
movant explain to the court why a preliminary injunction is necessary instead of
proceeding to a trial on the merits.92

Denlow argues that courts should actively

discourage preliminary injunctions and should encourage parties to proceed to trial by
asking “what is the critical component of the case that requires the grant of the injunction
between the time the preliminary injunction can be decided and the time an actual trial on
the merits can take place that cannot be satisfied by proceeding to a trial on the merits?”93
He argues that if there is no immediacy to prevent a situation that may become
irremediable before a trial, “the parties and the court will be better served with a trial on
the merits instead of a duplicitous hearing on the preliminary injunction followed by a
trial on the merits.”94
The second factor, which Denlow argues is the most important, requires movants
to demonstrate at least a 50% chance of success on the merits. 95 According to Denlow,
this factor is intended to dissuade those parties who do not have a strong case from
seeking a preliminary injunction when permanent relief would not necessarily be
available to them if their case proceeded to a trial on the merits.96 Lastly, he suggests that
“a preliminary injunction should not be entered unless the harm to the movant is greater
than the harm to the nonmoving party taking into account possible bonds by either
side.”97 Based on these factors, Denlow argues that adopting a sliding scale method, a
two-part test, or a four-part balancing test manipulates the judicial process and wastes
92

Id. at 537 (“First, the litigant must explain what aspect of their case requires that an injunction be granted
instead of proceeding to a trial on the merits. Second, the litigant must show that there is irreparable harm
and that there is not an adequate remedy without the preliminary injunction.”).
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Id. at 537.
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valuable court time because these tests allow a movant to succeed on a motion for a
preliminary injunction with a lower chance of success on the merits because there is a
strong showing of irreparable harm.98
Denlow proposes a uniform standard because parties face confusion when
confronted with determining what standard should apply for granting or denying a
preliminary injunction motion.99 He argues that a uniform standard would remedy the
discord present among the circuits due to the differing applications of the substantive four
factors.

Denlow states that the lack of a uniform standard has caused inconsistent

judgments and inequitable decisions.100
Denlow refers to two Seventh Circuit cases to demonstrate how differing
standards can cause inconsistent judgments.101 The Seventh Circuit in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., affirmed a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of the name
“HERBROZAC” on herbal dietary supplements.102 Conversely, in Barbecue Marx, Inc.
v. Ogdent, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction enjoining the use
of the name “BONE DADDY” for a forthcoming restaurant because it was too similar to
the movant’s “SMOKE DADDY” restaurant.103 In those cases, the two movants were
required to establish two different standards for the likelihood of success on the merits
factor.104
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Id.
Id. at 497.
100
Id.
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Id. at 531; See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) and Barbecue
Marx, Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F. 3d 1041 (7th Cir. 2000).
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104
Denlow, supra note 3 at 531 (“In order to succeed in Eli Lilly, the plaintiff was required to establish ‘a
likelihood of success on the merits.’ Conversely, in Barbecue Marx the plaintiff was required to show only
‘a greater than negligible chance of prevailing on the merits’ to meet the reasonable likelihood of success
standard . . . it is unmistakable that ‘a likelihood of success on the merits’ standard and ‘a greater than
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As a magistrate judge, Denlow grounds his reasons for a uniform standard in his
concern for administrative efficiency in courts. His concerns for a routine application of
one standard, so as to promote efficiency in the court system, and limiting the judge’s
discretion are contrary to the essence of the preliminary injunction and its label as being
an extraordinary remedy. The Supreme Court has not yet stated any need for a uniform
standard, but the Supreme Court has recently expounded on its standard for injunctive
relief.105

This recent decision by the Supreme Court paves the way for a uniform

standard which may address some of the concerns voiced by the proponents of a uniform
standard; however, the court does not discuss any of the concerns set forth by Judge
Denlow.

VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION STANDARD.
The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to discuss the applicable
standards of granting or denying preliminary injunctive relief in the federal system.
However, the Court has not expressly addressed the issue of differing standards amongst
the circuit courts. The Court commented on the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief
in University of Texas v. Camenisch:
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the
relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.
Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if
those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily
granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is
less complete than in a trial on the merits. A party thus is not required to
prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing and the findings
negligible chance of prevailing on the merits’ standard are not the same, thereby creating widespread
confusion and potentially leading to inconsistent results depending on the panel. This confusion is
multiplied when one looks at the variety of standards that exist among the circuits.”).
105
Winter, 129 S.Ct. 265.
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of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary
injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.106

The Supreme Court continued to acknowledge the flexibility of the preliminary
injunction standard.
In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, “the Supreme Court
circumscribed modern federal equity jurisdiction by holding that a district court has no
authority to issue a preliminary injunction restraining a debtor’s assets in order to protect
an anticipated money judgment since such relief was not traditionally granted by
equity.”107 The Court considered the issue of “whether, in an action for money damages,
a United States District Court has the power to issue a preliminary injunction preventing
the defendant from transferring assets in which no lien or equitable interest is
claimed.”108 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision to preliminarily
enjoin the holding company from transferring certain assets prior to final judgment.109
The majority opinion referenced the traditional notion of equity and flexibility; however,
stated that the injunction granted by the District Court did not meet the standards of a
preliminary injunction.110
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University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1981).
Muscato, supra note 2 at 661 (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions that have given the Court the
opportunity to discuss the applicable standards for the use of preliminary injunctive relief); Grupo
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On November 12, 2008 the Supreme Court announced its decision in Winter v.
Natural Defense Council.111 This case concerned the United States Navy’s usage of a
certain type of sonar during anti-submarine warfare training.112 The movants argued that
the use of this sonar was detrimental to the health of the marine mammals living off the
coast of Southern California.113 The movants sought declaratory and injunctive relief on
the grounds that these training exercises violated the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972.114
The District Court granted the movants’ motion for injunctive relief and
prohibited the Navy from using MFA sonar during the anti-submarine warfare training
exercises.115 “The court held that plaintiffs had ‘demonstrated a probability of success’
on their claims [and] . . . also determined that equitable relief was appropriate because,
under Ninth Circuit precedent, plaintiffs had established at least a ‘possibility’ of
irreparable harm to the environment.”116

The Navy appealed the district court’s

injunction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court’s decision
that an injunction was necessary.117 However, the appellate court concluded that “a
blanket injunction prohibiting the Navy from using MFA sonar . . . was overbroad” and
remanded the case to the District court to narrow the injunction “so as to provide
mitigation conditions under which the Navy may conduct its training exercises.” 118 On
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Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 372.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 372-73.
117
Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 373.
118
Id.
112

21

remand, the district court enforced mitigation measures to be implemented by the Navy;
however the Navy sought relief from the Executive Branch.119
The Council on Environmental Quality determined that the injunction set forth by
the district court created an unreasonable risk because the Navy will not be able to
properly train and certify a fully capable mission.120 Based on these findings, the Navy
again moved to vacate the district court’s injunction; however, the district court refused
to do so and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision again.121 The Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits and also
determined that they “carried their burden of establishing a ‘possibility’ of irreparable
injury.”122
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s second
decision to affirm and vacated the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court first set
forth the four factors a movant must establish when seeking a preliminary injunction.123
The Supreme Court did not agree with the standard used by the district court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s standard for
irreparable harm. “The district court and the Ninth Circuit also held that when a plaintiff
demonstrates a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction
may be entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm . . . [w]e agree with the
119

Id. at 373 (“The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch. The President, pursuant to 16
U.S.C. §1456(c)(1)(B), granted the Navy an exemption from the CZMA. Section 1456(c)(1)(B) permits
such exemptions if the activity in question is ‘in the paramount interest of the United States.’ The President
determined that continuation of the exercises as limited by the Navy was ‘essential to national security.’
He concluded that compliance with the District Court’s injunction would ‘undermine the Navy’s ability to
conduct realistic training exercises that are necessary to ensure the combat effectiveness of . . . strike
groups.’”).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 374.
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Id.
123
Id. (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, the he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).
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Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.”124 The standard the
Supreme Court requires is stricter; a movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is
likely and not just a possibility.125 The Court stated that “issuing a preliminary injunction
based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of
injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”126
The Court continued by stating that injunctive relief is not proper because any
irreparable injury the plaintiffs may have shown is outweighed by the public interest and
Navy’s interest in “realistic training of its sailors.”127

The Navy argued that the

injunction will hinder training efforts and ultimately leave strike groups vulnerable to
enemy submarine warfare, thus reducing national defense.128 The Court stated the overall
public interest weighed significantly in favor of the Navy.129
The Supreme Court concluded that “the District Court and Ninth Circuit
significantly understated the burden the preliminary injunction would impose on the
Navy” and the injunction would have an adverse impact on the public interest in the
country’s national defense.130 The Court reversed the injunctive relief affirmed by the
court of appeals and vacated the preliminary injunction to the extent challenged by the
Navy.131
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VII. HOW MAY THE WINTER DECISION AFFECT THE STANDARD UTILIZED BY THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS TODAY AND IS THIS A STEP TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM
STANDARD.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter may have far-reaching effects beyond its
environmental impact. This decision “affects every federal case in which a preliminary
injunction is requested.”132 The Court reiterated the four factors that a plaintiff must
show when seeking a preliminary injunction, but tightened the standard compared to the
standard utilized by the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of the standard, in
which a plaintiff only had to show a possibility of irreparable harm if able to show a
strong likelihood of success on the merits.133 The Court stated that this standard was “too
lenient” and “inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is
entitled to such relief.”134 Thus, the court tightened the standard by stating that the denial
of the injunction must make irreparable harm likely to the plaintiff.135
The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter leans towards a clear showing of all four
factors.136 The circuits that relied on a sliding scale test, “the higher the likelihood of
success, the less irreparable harm need be proved, so when success looks like a sure
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thing, sometimes only the possibility of irreparable harm will suffice,” 137 may have to
adopt a new formulation of the standard; however, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent states that
as of yet the Court has not expressly rejected the sliding scale method.
In Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, she states that she does not believe that the
majority opinion rejects the sliding scale formulation.138 Ginsburg reminds the court that
one of the most important characteristics of equity is flexibility. 139 She emphasizes the
flexibility of equity by stating that courts in the past have not required that a movant
“show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable success or injury before awarding
equitable relief.”140 Thus, in keeping with the essential characteristic of equity, Ginsburg
denies that the majority opinion rejects the use of a sliding scale formulation. The
majority opinion does not make it clear whether it is or is not rejecting the sliding scale
formulation; the answer is left to the lower federal courts in interpreting the Winter
decision. Thus, the Winter decision may only help to harmonize the circuit courts on the
issue of the appropriate standard for a preliminary injunction, but has not expressly set
forth one standard.
A. Lower Federal Courts’ Interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Decision in
Winter.
Recently, several lower federal courts have interpreted the Winter decision as
setting forth a new standard for injunctive relief. District courts in the First, Second,
Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits, have all interpreted the standard set forth in
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Winter.141 Thus, the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision may include raising
the threshold level needed for all four factors to receive injunctive relief by requiring that
irreparable harm and success on the merits be likely, and not just a possibility, and the
possible disappearance of the sliding scale formulation because of the need for a clear
showing of all four factors.
The United States District Court for the District of Maine discussed the recent
Winter decision in Animal Welfare Institute v. Martin.142 In its discussion of irreparable
harm, the court interpreted the Winter decision and concluded that “the correct test for
irreparable injury is whether the [movants] have demonstrated irreparable injury is likely
if the injunction is not granted.”143

The court also stated that it “does not agree,

particularly following Winter, that if [movants] demonstrate the other prongs for
injunctive relief, the [movants] are relieved from demonstrating irreparable injury.”144
Maine is in the First Circuit. The recent decision in Animal Welfare Institute
discussed the previous standard used by the First Circuit. The court acknowledged the
heightened standard used in Lanier Professional Services., Inc. v. Ricci; the court in
Lanier used the language of “a significant risk of irreparable harm.”145 However, the
court also acknowledged that the First Circuit did “not carry forward Lanier’s precise
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See generally Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 588 F.Supp.2d. 70 (D. Me. Nov. 26, 2008), Newmarkets
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wording”146 and the irreparable injury test used predominantly by the First Circuit was
“the potential for irreparable harm if injunction is denied.”147 This test utilized by the
First Circuit required only a potential for harm, while the court in Winter required harm
be likely. Thus, the court in Animal Welfare Institute interpreted Winter as changing the
standard in the First Circuit. It adopted the that “a movant must ‘demonstrate that
irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction,”148 consistent with Winter, as
the “correct test” for granting injunctive relief.149
Idaho is in the Ninth Circuit, in which the Winter decision originated. The United
States District Court for the District of Idaho discussed the change of the preliminary
injunction standard in the Ninth Circuit in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Timchak.150
The Ninth Circuit strays from the traditional four part test and follows its own formulated
two part test. However, the Supreme Court criticized one aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s
test. The District Court stated in its opinion that “the Supreme Court . . . criticized the
portion of the Ninth Circuit’s standard that allows the preliminary injunction to be
entered based only on the ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm . . . judicial prudence would
dictate . . . to require that a plaintiff demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely rather than
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a mere possibility.”151

Thus, a district court in the Ninth Circuit has modified the

standard previously used based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the revised standard in W. VA. Ass’n of Club Owners
& Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave.152 The Fourth Circuit had always employed the a
hardship balancing test set forth in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilif Mfg. Co..

153

Following Blackwelder, the courts in the Fourth Circuit considered factors set forth by
the Blackwelder court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction: “(1) the
likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied; (2)
the likelihood of harm to the defendant if the preliminary injunction is granted; (3) the
likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.”154
However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, the court employed a revised
standard and adopted the Supreme Court’s standard for further use.155 The revised
standard condenses the “hardship balancing test” previously used by the Fourth Circuit
into the Supreme Court’s third factor.156 Thus, the Fourth Circuit applied the revised
standard set forth by the Winter court and addressed the heightened irreparable harm
burden by condensing the hardship test previously applied.
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Also, lower courts in the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision
by requiring that a plaintiff show that success on the merits was likely instead of showing
success on the merits was a probability.157 The court in Quesenberry v. Volvo Group
North America stated “ it appears that under standards set forth in Winter and employed
in Musgrave, the plaintiff must, at the very least, show that success on the merits is more
likely than not.”158 In the past, the courts in the Fourth Circuit required only a probability
of success on the merits to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.159 If this
revised standard set forth in Quesenberry is followed, it would establish a burden of
persuasion on two factors and not just on the irreparable harm factor set forth in Winter.

VIII. CONCLUSION
“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor
to do equity and mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”160

The circumstances to which each factor of the preliminary injunction test should
be applied were never prescribed by the Rule and thus, left the courts to determine their
application.161 “Because of its discretionary character, an injunction decree typically is
drafted in flexible terms, can be molded to meet the needs of each case, and may be
157

Id. at *27 (“A probability, not a mere possibility, of success of the ultimate trial on the merits was
required to establish a likelihood of success on the merits).
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modified if circumstances change after it is issued or in the event that it fails to achieve
its objectives.”162

The preliminary injunction was deemed an extraordinary remedy

because of its discretionary character. No single factor was determinative as to whether
equitable relief was appropriate or not, a balancing was required and not a mechanical
application of a laid out test.163
The different applications of these factors cause many to urge the Supreme Court
to articulate one standard for granting injunctive relief.

Among this group is U.S.

Magistrate Judge Martin Denlow. Denlow’s argument for one standard does not take into
consideration the characteristics of injunctive relief and only focuses on efficiency.164
Denlow briefly discussed the concerns raised by other proponents, but his argument
focuses on the additional expenses and delay created by motions for preliminary
injunctions.165 Arguments for one standard should be more concerned with inconsistent
judgments, forum shopping and inequitable decisions. When each court is able to apply a
different standard or require differing levels of burden on the plaintiff, inconsistent
judgments may occur and this does not serve justice.
Originally, equity essentially was a system of a single chancellor making
decisions according to his conscience; therefore there was no need for a single, uniform
standard. However, in today’s larger federal system it is harder to have such a system.
One chancellor is not making the same decisions continuously, but many “chancellors”
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are making decisions and some are not consistent. Therefore, the application of the
factors continues to vary throughout the judicial system.
However, post-Winter, lower federal courts have heightened the burden of
showing irreparable harm based on the Supreme Court’s decision.166 The court stated
that one circuit was “too lenient” in its standard, thus applying the test incorrectly. 167 By
heightening the Ninth Circuit’s standard, the Supreme Court is reiterating the
extraordinary characterization of this remedy by making it more difficult for a movant to
obtain a preliminary injunction and limiting judges’ broad discretion.
The Supreme Court may realize that the differing standards in each circuit may
lead to inconsistent judgments and inequitable remedies; however, the Court seems
reluctant to expressly articulate one standard. The Court may be reluctant to articulate
one standard due to the characterization of equity as flexible, as evidenced by Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.168

Despite this reluctance, lower federal courts have

altered their standards after interpreting the Winter decision. Thus, in a way, the Winter
decision has indirectly lessened the flexibility of the preliminary injunction standard.
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